On the State of the Inter-domain and Intra-domain Routing Security

Date and time: 
Friday, December 4, 2015 - 10:00
Location: 
220 Deschutes
Author(s):
Mingwei Zhang
University of Oregon
Host/Committee: 
  • Jun Li (Chair)
  • Reza Rejaie
  • Hank Childs
Abstract: 

Routing is a key component toward building an interconnected network architecture. There are intra-domain and inter-domain routing protocol. The de facto inter-domain routing protocol, Border Gateway Protocol, has experienced increasingly frequent anomalous incidents, such as IP prefix hijackings, route leaks, or large-scale disruptive routing events. The recent intra-domain routing scheme, i.e. software-defined networking (SDN) and OpenFlow protocol, also show numerous security weaknesses. To prevent such anomalous or disruptive events, researchers need to carefully consider security upgrades to the existing protocols, and design accurate detection mechanisms. In this study, we conduct comprehensive survey on the existing security mechanisms for both inter-domain and intra-domain routing protocols. For each routing protocol, we look at both anomaly prevention solutions and anomaly detection mechanisms. The study summarizes the strength and weakness of the existing solutions, and discusses the research gaps for further research directions.

Tags: